The full dispatch contains 38 questions across four sections. What follows is Section 1 in its entirety — 10 questions, each with its mechanism, what it reveals, and the red flags that mean the territory problem is being mistaken for a performance problem.
Read it. If you recognise the problems, the remaining 28 questions are in the full dispatch.
Run before you assign quotas. Run it when a rep is underperforming and nobody has looked at the territory. Run it when your instinct says the model is broken but nobody will say it out loud. Ten questions. The territory problem becomes a performance problem if you don't ask them.
Most territory opportunity figures are either inherited from a previous model, estimated from headcount, or derived from top-line TAM that has not been segmented to territory level. None of these are opportunity figures. They are approximations presented as evidence. The question forces the distinction.
What the answer revealsIf the number cannot be traced to a documented methodology — firmographic data, historical win rates, product-market penetration by segment — it is not an opportunity figure. It is an assumption. Assumptions do not belong in a quota plan.
Quota is frequently derived from business need — what the company requires — and distributed to territories without reference to what each territory can actually produce. The result is that some territories are over-asked and some are under-asked, and the difference is called a performance gap.
What the answer revealsA quota that exceeds documented opportunity is not an ambitious target. It is a structural failure. If the territory cannot carry the number, no amount of rep performance will fix that. The quota-to-opportunity ratio is the most important number in territory design and almost nobody calculates it.
Territory models decay. Markets shift, competitors enter, accounts grow or contract, industries consolidate. A model that reflected the market accurately three years ago may now be systematically unfair — not because anyone made a bad decision, but because nobody checked whether the original decisions still hold.
What the answer revealsIf nobody can name the last redesign date, or if the answer is "it was before I joined," the model has been on autopilot. Autopilot territory models compound unfairness over time. Every market shift that goes unaddressed is another layer of inequity embedded in the quota plan.
Consistent over-achievement in the same territories across different reps and different years is a structural signal, not a talent signal. If the territory produces 150% of quota regardless of who is in it, the territory is over-ripe, not the rep exceptional. The question separates the variable that is being measured from the variable that is doing the explaining.
What the answer revealsConsistent over-achievement in the same territories is not evidence of great reps. It is evidence of territory imbalance. The quota is too low for the opportunity, which means the model is subsidising attainment for some while withholding it from others.
The default response to underperformance is a performance management conversation. The second default is to replace the rep. Neither of these responses examines whether the territory itself is the cause. If the same territory underperforms across multiple reps, the rep is not the variable that explains it.
What the answer revealsPersistent underperformance in the same territories is not a hiring problem or a coaching problem until the territory has been cleared of suspicion. If the model has never been examined, the model is the primary suspect. Performance managing a rep for a territory problem is not management. It is misdirection.
Named account allocation is one of the most consequential and least examined decisions in territory design. Accounts are frequently allocated based on who had the relationship, who was in the territory first, or which manager negotiated hardest. None of these are evidence-based criteria. All of them produce inequitable distributions.
What the answer revealsIf accounts were assigned because of relationships, geography, or legacy decisions rather than opportunity weighting, the distribution is unfair by design. The rep who inherited the accounts with the highest propensity to expand is not in a comparable position to the rep who inherited accounts that have already churned their value. The quota does not know the difference.
Selling time is finite. A rep who spends 40% of their working week in transit is not the same as a rep whose entire territory is a 20-minute drive from their desk. Geographic coverage burden directly reduces the hours available for selling, and those hours are the denominator under every quota. If the quota does not account for the denominator, it is not comparable across territories.
What the answer revealsIf the quota does not account for coverage burden, you are comparing incomparable things and calling the difference performance. The rep with the geographically demanding territory is being asked to achieve the same result with less selling time. That is not ambition. That is a structural disadvantage that will show up as a performance problem.
New business quota assumes that every rep has access to the same addressable pool of prospective accounts. In most territory models, that assumption is false. Some territories have a deep pool of well-matched prospects. Others have been picked over by previous reps, are dominated by competitors, or have limited product-market fit in the segment assigned.
What the answer revealsIf one territory has twice the new logo opportunity of another but both carry the same new business quota, the quotas are not equivalent. They are the same number applied to different markets. That is not fairness — it is arithmetic presented as strategy. The rep in the depleted territory is not failing to prospect. They are prospecting in a smaller pond.
Every territory model was built by a person with a view of the market at a point in time. That view included assumptions — about which segments would grow, which geographies would be productive, which account types would convert. Those assumptions were reasonable then. They are out of date now. The question is which ones are still quietly embedded in the quota plan, undiscussed and unchallenged.
What the answer revealsIf nobody can name the designer or the assumptions, the model has become institutional folklore — inherited, not examined. Folklore territory models are dangerous because the assumptions they contain are invisible. The decisions they enforce look like neutral facts. They are not. They are someone's judgement, made in a different market, still operating today.
This is the territory design stress test. It removes the rep variable and isolates the territory variable. If the best rep in the organisation would fail in the lowest-performing territory, the territory is the explanation for the underperformance — not the rep currently in it. The question makes that logic unavoidable.
What the answer revealsIf the honest answer is "their numbers would drop significantly," you have confirmed that the territory is the variable, not the rep. You now have the evidence. The question is what you do with it. Running another PIP in that territory without addressing the model is not a performance management decision. It is a decision to ignore the evidence.
Three more sections. An addressable opportunity assessment. A coverage and capacity analysis. An inherited decision review. A scoring rubric. Four printable worksheets.
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